Napoleonic Archive 24 The Inquiry into the Convention of Cintra
Published by Ken Trotman Publishing September 2026
The Convention of Cintra was contentious from the moment of signing at Queluz Palace on 30 August 1808, although to the Generals signing it, it made sound military sense. The news of the Convention arriving in London on 2 September, saw great jubilation throughout the country for the best part of a fortnight, but then rapidly changed to horror as it became widely known that the French army would be transported back to France in British ships and demands for a public enquiry grew loud both in the streets and in Parliament. The poet William Wordsworth (1770-1850) summed up their feelings as ‘We are all here in a rage about the Convention in Portugal; if Sir Hew were to show his face among us, or that other doughty Knight, Sir Arthur [Wellesley], the very Boys would hiss them out of the Vale.’ Even George Canning (1770-1827) who was the foreign secretary declared it ‘a disgrace and disaster.’ This reaction is a little difficult to explain however, the public being perfectly happy to see the French Garrison of Genoa in June 1800 and the French army of Egypt shipped home in 1801 on British ships.
Sir Arthur Wellesley had already returned to Britain on 20 September 1808 on the pretext of continuing his career as Military Secretary in Ireland, rather than remaining as seventh in command behind Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, Sir John Moore, Sir John Hope, Alexander Mackenzie Fraser, and Henry, Lord Paget according and reduced to commander of the 4th Division [See Table 1]. This also gave him the advantage to make his case with Ministers that he had been superseded and told to sign the Convention by his superiors, in an effort to distance himself from the public furore, before returning to the relative calm of Dublin.
The Government, supported by the King and the Duke of York decided that a public enquiry should be held at the Royal College at Chelsea beginning on 14 November 1808. This resulted in Sir Harry Burrard, Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Arthur Wellesley being ordered to attend as well as a number of other officers involved in the negotiations. But it must be clearly understood that it was a public enquiry and not a court martial. It was to continue for some five weeks, ending on 27 December 1808.
Republishing the Inquiry into the Armistice and Convention that liberated Portugal is important for a thorough understanding of the British Army, politics, and the state of the Portuguese and Spanish Armies at the time. The French army had been beaten in the field at Rolica and Vimiero, but may have attempted to defend the mountains utilising the numerous fortresses surrounding Lisbon and commanding the Tagus.
Arthur Wellesley was instrumental in the negotiation of the Armistice of Cintra with General Kellermann, but he certainly sought to distance himself from it in the aftermath. The controversial clauses he had negotiated were tidied up and eventually specified in the Convention by Lt-Col George Murray, giving him plausible deniability.
Without achieving the removal of the entire French Army from Portuguese soil, it would not have been possible for the British and reconstituted Portuguese Army to recapture the important fortresses in Portugal before winter. Certainly, these garrisons would have been able to hold out until the following year and possibly even as long as Napoleon’s invasion of Spain, which would have prevented General Moore’s advance into Spain or providing any support to the efforts of the Spanish armies. This would have meant that Britain would not have had a safe base from which to operate on continental Europe for a considerable time to come.
Fort Julian [Fort of São Julião da Barra] commanded the approaches to the of the Tagus with Forts de Bourgie, Trafuria and Palmela supported by other batteries. These would have barred the Royal Navy from the Port of Lisbon. If it was intended to proceed in the attack of Fort St Julien by a regular siege it would have required much time … [Captain Preval of the Portuguese Engineers, p167] Major Richard Fletcher RE also gave an assessment of Fort of St Julien and the Defences of the coastline west of it as far as the Rock of Lisbon dated 28 September 1808 [Report 168 in this volume].
The British Army would only be able to borrow some Royal Naval 18-pdr guns but would be unable to move them without a siege train lacking horses. The landing of these on the open beach would have been very hazardous in the expert opinion of Captain Sir Pulteney Malcolm (1768-1838) of HMS Donegal that supervised the landings of the British Army.
Even more challenging would be the considerable Portuguese border fortresses of Elvas (211 km East of Lisbon) and Almeida (360 km north-east of Lisbon) were still held by French garrisons. These were at least 10 and 18 march days from Lisbon respectively. A siege train would take at least double that time. In Sir Arthur Wellesley’s address to the House of Commons on 21 February 1809 stated, ‘After our army should have got possession of the forts on the Tagus, it would be necessary to put in a situation of equipment fitted for reducing the fort of Elvas by a regular siege, and for this a considerable length of time would have been required to reduce the fort till the beginning of December [1808]…’
This was reliant on quickly making the Port of Lisbon available for British shipping and does not include the next task of taking Almeida.. It should be remembered that the successful allied sieges of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz took over one month from digging the first siege battery position.
The Russian fleet trapped in the Tagus was initially included in the Treaty, but following complaints by the Admiral led to the signing of a subsequent and separate treaty which was signed by Admiral Seniavin of the Russian Navy and Sir Charles Cotton of the Royal Navy. By its terms the Russian Navy was escorted to Britain (not as prizes), where the crews were to be repatriated to Russia, while the ships were to remain mothballed until a treaty of peace between Russia and Britain. In the end very few ships ever returned as they were condemned as rotten.
It should be remembered that Portugal was under French rule by Right of Conquest by international law at the time. A tribunal from the three countries (Britain, France & Portugal) decided whether the property claimed was legally obtained or stolen; ruling that any stolen goods were to be confiscated by the British commissioners [Lord Proby and Maj-Gen Beresford] and returned to their rightful owners.
The Inquiry completed with a decision that no charges should be brought against any of the three senior officers, but both Burrard and Dalrymple were never employed in an active military role again. Sir Arthur Wellesley had a number of influential supporters in the Government and he soon found himself of his way back to Portugal.
It is interesting that the British Army in Portugal had five changes in command in just a few months; Sir Arthur Wellesley (July-21 Aug 1808), Sir Harry Burrard (21-22 Aug), Sir Hew Dalrymple (22 Aug-4 Oct 1808), Sir Harry Burrard (4 Oct-8 Nov 1808) and finally Sir John Craddock in late 1808; with Sir John Moore leading the invasion force in Spain on 6 October 1808.
The editors have split the original book into chapters according to the days of the inquiry to make it easier for the reader to follow. The tables are the returns from both armies given in the evidence. The maps at the end can be seen in colour in our (2025) Landmann’s Military and Picturesque Observations on Portugal and (2025) Views of Portugal and Spain in War.
We wish to thank the National Library of Portugal in Lisbon for permission to reproduce this rare and important volume. Also, Susan Law of the Shorncliffe Trust and the Friends of Torres Vedras and Moises Gaudencio for their comments and encouragement. Not least the patience of our publisher, Richard Brown of Ken Trotman.